

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



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WEEKLY RECORD
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UNITED STATES
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The NATO Conference at Paris

Report by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles¹

The President: Good evening, my friends.

For the fifth time within the past 5 years, the Secretary of State and I have, together, returned to Washington after international conferences on foreign soil. This time we have just come from the Paris meeting with Heads of Government of the 14 other NATO nations.²

In addition to the scheduled NATO meetings last week, I had individual conferences with most of the Heads of Government. In these more was involved than mere expression of mutual good will. In each, the purpose was to discuss frankly our viewpoints about problems of common interest, to remove obstacles to mutual understanding.

In the debates of the full conference there were thoroughly discussed specific problems of every conceivable nature so as to eliminate deficiencies in our collective arrangements.

It was an inspiring experience to watch in these meetings common policies take shape affecting the great questions of peace, security, and unity. Planning for carrying into effect these policies was likewise necessary. In this work all of us found a special advantage which came out of the bringing together of Heads of Government. In this way there was placed behind NATO's future programs the authority and influence which these leaders hold.

There was one basic purpose implicit in every discussion and debate of the conference. That

was the pursuit of a just peace. Not once during the week did I hear any slightest hint of saber-rattling or of aggressive intent.

Of course, all of us were concerned with developing the necessary spiritual, economic, and military strength of our defensive alliance. We are determined that there must be no war. But we never lost sight of our hope that the men in the Kremlin would themselves come to understand their own need for peace as well as our sincerity in desiring a just composition of differences between West and East.

At the end, the conference unanimously adopted a declaration of principles³ to guide future NATO efforts and plans. Measures were adopted for effective scientific and economic cooperation and coordination.

We arranged for procedures to insure timely and close political consultations among ourselves with respect to any problem that might arise. A large list of other matters engaged our attention.

To discuss a few of these in some detail, I have asked the Secretary of State to make a brief report, as well as to give now some of his reactions and impressions of the conference.

Secretary Dulles: As you say, Mr. President, every thought, every action taken at that NATO Council meeting was in terms of peace. How would it be possible to achieve a just and a durable peace?

We did *not* think that such a peace could be achieved through weakness. Time after time desponds have struck when they thought they had a clear military advantage.

We did *not* think that such a peace could be

¹ Made to the Nation over radio and television from the White House on Dec. 23.

² For statements made by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles at the Paris meeting, together with texts of the declaration and final communique, see *BULLETIN* of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

achieved in disunity. Time after time, peaceful nations have succumbed because they stood alone.

We *did* accept the view that peace requires an accommodation of viewpoints, and that no nation or group of nations, however right they may feel they are, can expect to have their way one hundred percent.

These three themes, unity, strength, and flexibility, were the background for the decisions of this NATO Council meeting of last week.

The North Atlantic Council has always had a December meeting at which it took major decisions for the coming year or years, and this year the matters up for decision were of unusually great importance. And by that I do not mean to suggest that we had in mind anything that was surprising or spectacular. Indeed, we deliberately avoided the spectacular.

All of the decisions were what you might call commonsense decisions, but common sense, unfortunately, is not always common. And it is a tribute to NATO that it has demonstrated a capacity to act in accordance with what is logical and sensible.

Decisions on Nuclear Weapons and Missiles

Now the decisions that attracted the most attention were, of course, those that dealt with nuclear weapons and missiles.

The NATO countries, including the United States, have long and earnestly studied the need of making these weapons available on the continent of Europe. Our purpose has been to be strong but not to be provocative, and we all had been hopeful that the Soviet Union would agree to the Western proposals for a worldwide ending of the production of nuclear weapons and the gradual absorption of existing nuclear material into peaceful-purpose stocks.

That Western proposal, which could be recapitulated, perhaps, in terms of the slogan "Stop Making Bombs," has been overwhelmingly endorsed by the United Nations, and the only votes in opposition to that "Stop Making Bombs" proposal were the Soviet bloc.

But that opposition was violent. The Soviet rulers seemed stubbornly determined to go on building up nuclear weapons and missiles, apparently clinging to the hope that they may yet, through power, dominate the world. And in the

face of that stubborn persistence it would be folly, as the NATO Council said, to accept the Soviet view that the Soviet Union should have nuclear weapons and missiles with which to threaten Western Europe while Western Europe itself should have for its defense only weapons of the preatomic age.

So the Council decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads to be readily available in case of need. The NATO Council also decided that intermediate-range ballistic missiles should be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe.

And these decisions, of course, Mr. President, were unanimous decisions, because the Council only acts through unanimity.

It will be some little time before the intermediate missiles can actually be put in place on the continent of Europe. And if in the meantime there should be a disarmament agreement, obviously that disarmament agreement would take priority.

Efforts To Break Deadlock on Disarmament

We all hope that there will be such an agreement, and we shall try in all realistic ways to bring it about. The Council certainly made that clear.

Now, the difficulties in the way have, unhappily, been compounded by the Soviets. For now they don't merely reject the substance of our proposals: the Western proposals to stop making bombs, to stop testing bombs, and to have inspection as against surprise attack. They not only reject the substance of these matters, but now they also reject any procedure even for discussing them.

For several years now they have been negotiating through the procedure established through the United Nations. The Soviet Union says it no longer will take part in any discussions of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Just a few days ago the United Nations, in an effort to meet the Soviet viewpoint, reconstituted this Disarmament Commission, in accordance with the proposal that was made by India, Sweden, and Japan, among others.⁴ That was thought to be a conciliatory gesture toward the Soviet Union, but that gesture also has now been rebuffed.

Today the Soviets talk vaguely about turning

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1957, p. 961.

the whole matter over to the United Nations. But, of course, 82 nations obviously can't be a *negotiating* body. What they *can* do is to pronounce on general principles. But that the United Nations has already done. It has endorsed the Western proposals by an overwhelming vote with the Soviet bloc being absolutely alone in opposition.

Another thing that 82 nations can do is to set up a committee or a subcommittee to negotiate. That also the General Assembly has done. But the Soviets refuse to negotiate in that way.

Well, at NATO, in order to break the impasse, to see if we could find some way to proceed, we expressed there the willingness to accept *any* procedures that would promote the implementation of the disarmament proposals that the United Nations had approved or to examine any *other* proposals that might lead to a controlled reduction of armaments.

And also, as a matter of procedure, the Council suggested a meeting with the Soviets at the foreign-minister level in order to try to break the procedural deadlock. We suggested a meeting at the foreign-minister level because earlier this year the Soviet Union had indicated that they might be interested in that way of procedure.

The NATO Council and all of its members are in deadly earnest about this matter. As weapons become more powerful, more destructive, it becomes more urgent to find reliable ways to curb that destructive power.

The NATO Council made clear its determination to continue probing to find some evidence that there is within the Soviet Union the good will to resume serious efforts to achieve nuclear peace and to put behind us the horrible prospect of nuclear war.

And, Mr. President, I can and I do pledge that every resource of the Department of State and of the Foreign Service of the United States is going to be dedicated to that great endeavor under your high direction.

Increasing Weapons Production in Western Europe

Now, of course, we are trying thus to get a disarmament agreement. But until there is a disarmament agreement, and while the Soviets go on piling up their armaments, our own armament must proceed.

And if we are going to have armament, we surely ought to have it in the most efficient way that is practical. And so another decision taken by the NATO Council was to seek to use to a greater degree the capacity of our European allies to produce modern weapons delivery systems. The nuclear part of the warhead will, as a matter of simple efficiency and economy, continue, I suppose, for a considerable time to be made primarily by the United States. But the weapons themselves, including the intermediate-range ballistic missiles, can usefully come to be manufactured in Western Europe. And thus the very great scientific, technological, and industrial capabilities of our European allies can be coordinated with our own to serve more effectively the defensive arsenals of the free world.

This is going to require us to supply some nuclear data which, so far, we have kept closely restricted. That secretive policy of ours goes back to the days when we had a monopoly of atomic weapons and we hoped to dedicate that monopoly to the service of all humanity, the *peaceful* service of all humanity.

The Soviets, as everyone will recall, rejected that gesture, which was unique, I suppose, in the annals of all history.

Under the circumstances, it certainly is futile to deny to our allies information which they could use for our common good and information which the Soviets already possess.

Pooling Scientific Facilities

Now, another matter which we took up in Paris was the making of a greater effort to increase the number of people trained in science and technology, and also we agreed to an increased pooling of scientific facilities and information and the sharing of tasks. Most of the great technological developments of modern times, both military and nonmilitary, derive from a scientific genius which is not the monopoly of any one nationality. We all recall, I suppose, that we drew very heavily upon the talent of our European friends when it came to producing the first atomic weapon.

There is obvious need today to combine our talents so as to achieve and maintain the leadership in the new fields of limitless possibilities which open up before us.

6,108 Scientists Exchanged in 5-Year Period

According to the International Educational Exchange Service of the Department of State, 6,108 scientists took part in the Department's international educational exchange program during the 5-year period from July 1, 1951, to June 30, 1956. They constitute approximately one-fifth, or 21 percent, of the total number of persons exchanged during that period. More than half of these exchanges were between the United States and other NATO countries.

About 60 percent of the scientists came from other countries to the United States, primarily for advanced study or research. Medical scientists account for the largest number, with engineering, chemistry, physics, mathematics, and biochemistry ranking next.

More than 1,200 American scientists went abroad to lecture, study, or conduct advanced research. While there is less concentration among their fields of specialization as compared to foreign participants, it is noteworthy that the largest groups of American scientists included physicists, chemists, engineers, and mathematicians.

The range of scientific pursuits which relate to peaceful uses of atomic energy has grown tremendously in the last few years. During 1956, 183 exchanges under the Department's program were related to such endeavors.

Problems of Economic Development

The Council gave much attention to economic matters. We all felt that there was a great danger lest we overconcentrate on military matters and ignore the economic warfare—and the word “warfare” is the very word used by Khrushchev—economic warfare that the Soviets have declared on us. The Soviet-Chinese Communist bloc exploits their vast population to develop an expanding industrial base which not only supports a great military machine but also supplies the rulers with the possibility of making attractive-sounding economic offers to non-Communist countries. By these means they try to create a dependence upon the Communist world and to penetrate into, and finally to take over, the political and economic system of the now free nations.

That is particularly the case with the less developed countries of Asia and Africa, which, having newly gained *political* independence, seek urgently to find ways to lift their people out of that state of stagnant poverty which freedom can-

not tolerate. It is essential that the free-world nations which have amassed capital should increasingly put this to work in the capital-hungry free-world nations. Otherwise they may feel forced to turn to the Communist bloc for aid at a price which may be their freedom.

At the Paris meeting we decided that the NATO nations should seek more efficient means to advance the less developed areas of the free world. And I recall, Mr. President, that you told the NATO meeting of your proposals to ask the Congress for additional resources for this purpose. This is as necessary as the provision of additional funds for military purposes. I think, Mr. President, that you would gladly confirm that that is your clear opinion.

The President: With that I emphatically agree. I have said so.

Secretary Dulles: Well, we should, as you do and I do, take seriously this political-economic warfare that is being waged by the Soviet Union. Unless we do take it seriously, we can lose this struggle without ever a shot being fired. The Soviets by their economic offensive could take over the underdeveloped countries one by one. They would thereby increase their own resources in terms of manpower and natural resources and strategic locations, and by the same token the United States and its remaining friends would become ever more closely encircled, until finally we face strangulation.

Political Consultations

Now, my time on this report is running out, Mr. President, so I shall further mention only the matter of developing the habit of NATO political consultations.

This is needed to preserve the spirit of unity.

Now, last week's meeting was, as you pointed out, particularly significant because it gave the Heads of Government, as well as the Foreign Ministers, opportunity to talk together, not merely around a big conference table but in informal conversations. In that way it was possible to clear up a lot of misunderstandings and to do away with suspicions that in some way we were trying to work against each other in different parts of the world. And at the Council meeting we decided to put forth in the future every effort to carry forward that type of consultations

through the regular contacts in Paris of our Permanent Representatives.

These representatives meet in Paris on practically a day-to-day basis, and each of our nations has promised to keep its representative fully informed as to national policies which might have an impact of an important nature upon any other of the allies so that we can keep each other informed and achieve a greater cooperation, not merely in the interests of the Atlantic Community but in the interests of all the free world.

Now I think it is probably important to note the fact that of course NATO doesn't try to run the world, or even all the free world, or to rule over the destinies of other countries who are not represented in NATO.

I might recall, for the benefit of any who have any fears on this score, that, when the United States Senate ratified the North Atlantic Treaty, it did so in reliance of a unanimous report of the Foreign Relations Committee which said, and I quote,

It would be particularly unfortunate if our Government took part in "exclusive" consultations with Atlantic Pact members over situations of deep concern to friendly states in Asia, Africa, Latin America, or the Middle East.

That principle is as sound today as it ever was. It would be disruptive of the unity which is essential within the free world if free-world countries who are not members of NATO felt that their fate was being determined by members of the NATO Council in their absence.

That, it can be said with absolute confidence, is not going to happen. There was no evidence of desire on the part of the NATO Council or any of the members to attempt to set itself up as supreme over other free-world countries or other free-world organizations.

One evidence of that fact—concrete evidence—is that NATO now has the desire to explore on a basis of mutuality a possibility of liaison with other collective-defense organizations of a regional character, such as the Organization of American States, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Baghdad Pact.

The fact is that the peace of any part of the world can be put in jeopardy by what goes on in another part of the world. So it is in the common interest that there should be efforts to create a sense of cohesion and of confident interdependence as between the free-world nations every-

where. The final declaration to which you alluded, Mr. President, is categorical in this respect. It says, and again I quote,

... to all other peoples who, like ourselves, are dedicated to freedom in peace, we offer our cooperation on a basis of complete equality and in a spirit of fraternity.

Well, Mr. President, these decisions I have referred to are, I think you would agree, the most important of the decisions in which we participated. And indeed those decisions add up to quite a lot, assuming, of course, that they are carried out with vigor. That is going to require sustained effort and sacrifice, perhaps a good deal of sacrifice, on the part of all of us. But the fact that the decisions were taken under these solemn circumstances by the Heads of Government goes far to assure that these decisions will in fact be carried out.

And if they are carried out, it is going to give NATO a growing capacity to defend and to nurture the rich heritage of the Atlantic Community.

The President: Now, on his way back from Paris, Secretary Dulles briefly visited in Spain. He conferred with General Franco and others in the Spanish Government. I know you would like him to take a minute to give you a brief summary of that visit.

Secretary Dulles: Well, Mr. President, I was just saying that there are many strands in the fabric of the free world. NATO doesn't represent them all, and they all have to be carefully nurtured because, combined, they make the strength which is going to make the free world safe. My stopover at Madrid illustrates, I think, that point, because Spain is not itself a member of NATO.

On the other hand, we do have with Spain important arrangements which contribute very greatly to the strength and defense of the free world and of the NATO area.

We have, as a result of agreements which we made about 4 years ago, arrangements for building there a series of airbases, and also a naval base, for the joint use of Spain and the United States. The Spanish authorities, when they heard I had accepted their invitation, were gracious enough to suggest that my plane should come down at one of these new bases that we had jointly

built, so that I could be welcomed on this new base by the Spanish Foreign Minister and other Spanish officials. Indeed it is really a wonderful airbase, perhaps the finest I have ever been on. The runway, I understand, is one of the longest in the whole world.

From that airfield I went on to the Pardo Palace, where I had a really good talk with General Franco, the Chief of State. We were together for about 3 hours.

I told him about what had been happening at the NATO Council meeting and of the basic policies and the strategies that were being followed.

I felt that General Franco, by the contribution that his Government was making to the defense of Europe, had clearly entitled himself to that kind of information. In turn, the Spanish Chief of State gave me his estimate of the Soviet threat, and, incidentally, his estimate and that of the NATO Council were in very close agreement.

Then General Franco and I discussed other problems that were more especially of Spanish and United States concern.

I felt there a very genuine spirit of friendship and cordiality, as indeed had been the case when I was in Spain the previous time, in November 1955.

It is ties like this that hold the free world together, and they provide a striking contrast to the military coercion which alone holds together the countries of the Soviet bloc.

Now, of course, as between free nations there are from time to time differences and dissatisfactions. That is inevitable, however hard or skillfully we strive. But surmounting all is the sense of fellowship which unites those who are dedicated to a common cause and who sacrifice and risk that that cause may prevail.

And I should like, Mr. President, to express also our satisfaction that there is unity at home on the essentials. For example, the ideas which we took with us to Paris derived from a broad, nonpartisan base, and we are appreciative of such cooperation, as I am sure is the whole Nation.

Oftentimes, the dominant mood seems to be one of dissension and perplexity and discouragement. But that impression may well be superficial. Beneath the ruffled surface there can be a great body of good will, confidence, and resolution. It is particularly appropriate that at this time of the year we should recognize and pay tribute to those

sentiments, for they are the stuff out of which a better future can be built.

The President: To summarize: The Heads of the NATO Governments and their associates labored earnestly during the week to continue the strengthening of our common security. We all realize that adequate free-world strength, moral, economic, and military, is, under present circumstances, our most effective deterrent to war.

Moreover, it provides the basis for our best hope for progressive disarmament and improved understanding between East and West. Every American shares this hope with our NATO partners.

Beyond any doubt, we all are prepared to make any necessary sacrifice to sustain and advance that hope.

At the end of the conference, I expressed once more, as I have so often before, a constant readiness on the part of Secretary Dulles and myself personally to make any conceivable effort that might realistically help to reduce world tensions.

Unfortunately, the attitude of the Soviets toward the free world has, for years, alternated between threat and blandishment. Their words, their pretensions, their actions have all failed to inspire confidence in free men.

To bring about such an easing of tension, we believe that clear evidence of Communist integrity and sincerity in negotiation and in action is all that is required. Only with such evidence of integrity and sincerity and with the spirit of conciliation on both sides can there be achieved a definite beginning of progress toward universal security and peace, which the world so earnestly seeks.

For no nation, for no individual among us, could there be a finer Christmas present nor a better New Year.

Good night.

Secretary Dulles To Attend Baghdad Pact Session

The Department of State announced on December 29 (press release 683 dated December 28) that the Secretary General of the Baghdad Pact had been informed that Secretary Dulles will head the U.S. observer delegation to the fourth Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council session, which will be held January 27-30, 1958, at Ankara, Turkey.

The Strategy of Victory

*Address by Secretary Dulles*¹

My friend, President Bidault, it is indeed a very great pleasure to meet here with those who support good relations with the United States and development of the Atlantic Community. As you, President Bidault, have said, there is no use disguising the fact that our unity is not always perfect and that at times we seem to be working at cross-purposes. My experience has been that, when those who are on the whole reasonable—and we certainly are disposed to be friends—when they disagree, it is very largely because of misunderstanding. Now we have ambassadors who, using to the full the facilities that are given to them, try to eliminate those causes of misunderstanding. But unfortunately their cables have never yet served to replace the personal contacts and conversations of Heads of Government with each other. And so it is that this meeting here of the Heads of Government has served a very valuable purpose. We have taken decisions, decisions of major import, the full significance of which may not be apparent for some months or even years to come.

But perhaps most important of all, there have taken place conversations between the Heads of Government which, I think, have gone far to eliminate misapprehensions, misunderstandings which are at the root of seeming divergencies in our policies. For example, President Eisenhower learned, completely to his surprise, that it was widely felt in France that the United States was seeking to undermine the natural position of France in North Africa in order that we might replace French interests with American commer-

cial interests. When he heard that, I think I can say that he was both amazed and indeed indignant that any such rumors had gained a foothold. And I am sure that he made it quite apparent that the United States has no intention or desire whatsoever to interfere in the slightest with the normal relationships of France to North Africa, relationships which seem to be entirely consistent with the full independence of the new states of that area. Indeed, I think we all feel that a healthy relationship between Western Europe and Africa is of the utmost importance, and indeed that will figure in the communique which is being issued this afternoon by the heads of the NATO alliance.²

I might speak briefly about the tasks that we face, taking perhaps as my text a phrase from President Eisenhower's opening address³ in which he said, "There is a strategy of victory." Now, what is that strategy of victory? It requires first of all that we take account of the strength of our adversary and also that we take account of the weaknesses of our adversary.

The Strength of the Adversary

Now what are these strengths? They are very considerable indeed. When you have a totalitarianism which disposes of the human effort and of the material resources of people who comprise approximately one-third or more of the entire population of the earth, nearly one billion people, they can and do create an instrumentality of tremendous power. Their people operate as domestic animals would operate, getting enough to main-

¹ Made before the France-Etats Unis Association and the French National Association for the Atlantic Community at a luncheon in his honor at Paris on Dec. 19.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 12.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

tain their physical existence, enough in the way of food, clothing, and shelter to be able to work efficiently. Otherwise, all that they produce is taken by the state to build up a material monument in terms of heavy industries, a great war machine, including the latest and most modern instruments of warfare.

And there is, of course, a special-privilege class in this supposedly classless society—a special class of those who because of their particular abilities in the way of science and technical applications can make a special contribution to building up this great machine. The education of their people is organized so as to produce the largest possible number of scientists and technicians. When you see this great mass of people being organized, being exploited, merely to produce a great machine which is designed to enable this materialistic, atheistic despotism to dominate the world, that is indeed a very formidable challenge. It would indeed be very reckless of us to underestimate that challenge and not to prepare adequately to meet it. Because we see this challenge assuming steadily mounting proportions, we have had this meeting here of this North Atlantic Council to help prepare the answer.

The Weakness of the Adversary

Now, what is that answer to be? It must be an answer which takes account not merely of the strength of our adversaries but also of their weakness. What are their weaknesses? Well, of course, the basic and central weakness is the fact that they attempt to repress what in the long run is irrepressible, that is, the desire and longing of human beings for a measure of individual liberty and opportunity, to have a certain freedom to think and to believe, to have security in their own homes and to develop a family life, to have a choice as to the kind of work that they will do, and to have the opportunity to enjoy a fair proportion of the fruits of their labor. These are things that human beings have wanted from time immemorial, and they are the things that are wanted by the people of Russia. The repression of that is a weakness. Another weakness is the position of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe—the partition of Germany, a great people who belong together. The forceable partition in Germany is again an effort to do what in the long run cannot be done: the repression of the independence of the

people, the nations of Eastern Europe. In the long run these people will regain their independence. How many times has Poland been overrun, divided? Always it comes back, and surely it will come back again. In Hungary the love of their people for independence is something which cannot be indefinitely repressed. These are some of the weaknesses in the position of the Soviet rulers. Our response—our strategy of victory—must be a program which takes account both of the formidable strength that is arrayed against us and also which is calculated to exploit the weaknesses of those who are arrayed against us.

Now, of course, if we only thought in terms of developing enough material power to match the material power arrayed against us, that would be a relatively easy task. Our total populations have a productive capacity on the average of three times as great per capita as that of the Soviet Union. If the United States were to dedicate to its military purposes the same percentage of its gross national production as is the case with the Soviet Union, we would have a military budget approximately three times our present budget. It would be a budget of around \$120 billion, instead of \$40 billion. And if we were to triple our military expenditures, we could very quickly put the military establishment of the Soviet Union into a position of great inferiority. But, if all we do is to try to match the material effort of the Soviet Union, there is danger that we will destroy the qualities which enable us to take advantage of the weaknesses within the Soviet Union. We could not do what I describe without turning ourselves into a highly regimented society. We would have to control wages, hours of labor, prices. We would have to direct people as to what they did, where they worked, what they studied. We would make ourselves over in the image of what we want to change; and we would have destroyed the example of freedom and liberty which is a tremendous stimulant to those who, within the Soviet orbit, would themselves regain freedom and liberty. It is the contrasting example that we present which is one of our great assets in this struggle. To destroy that would be really to give up the hope of ultimate victory. Therefore, we must find a strategy here which, on the one hand, will enable us to be sufficiently strong to meet the menace of the Soviet threat, which is both military and also economic, in the way of

subversion, penetration, and do so without ourselves destroying the freedoms and liberties which we want to defend and the existence of which becomes a force in the world which is so apparent, so penetrating, that it encourages the people within the Soviet orbit to want themselves to strive more to get such freedoms and liberties, opportunities and enjoyments, as we ourselves—our peoples themselves—possess.

Working Together as Free People

Now we can do all of that very easily if we work together. We cannot do it at all if we work independently. Our combined strengths can readily be made sufficient to meet the menace without destroying our basic liberties. If each of us works separately, the only hope we will have of meeting that menace will be to destroy our liberties and consequently to destroy really the hope of ultimately bringing to an end this terrible, inhumane despotism. Now that does not mean we may not have to make more sacrifices than we are now making. But it does mean that by concerting our efforts, by pooling our resources, by combining our military, economic, and moral assets we shall be able on the one hand to meet the Soviet strength and on the other hand to set an example which will exploit to the full the Soviet weaknesses. And I remain absolutely confident that, if we follow in this course, the time will come—I do not say when it will come, 1 year, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, I do not know—but the time will come when inevitably the Soviet rulers will have to change their attitude toward their own people, toward the rest of the world. So long as we on the one hand are strong enough so that they do not win great successes abroad and strengthen their position at home, and also if we at the same time make our own freedom and liberty such a flaming example in the world that those people behind the iron curtain will feel it and sense it and demand more of it for themselves—that is the strategy of victory.

The heart of it is that we must work together, the free peoples, the free nations together. Only through unity and cooperation can we forge the elements that are needed to make us not merely safe but to create a force which is going to end at

some time the menace which today threatens us. Surely that must be our great objective. To live in a world where we perhaps are safe from destruction because we balance material power with material power, balance weapons of destruction with weapons of destruction—if that was all we could look forward to down the long range of history, during the years, the decades, the generations to come, that would be an intolerable situation. We have got to be able to look forward to an ending of this menace. The way to do it involves strength, yes, but strength which, because we work together, can be combined with freedom, so that we present both strength and freedom; strength to protect ourselves, freedom as the offensive, moral force which is going to bring this threat to an end.

Here at this meeting we have gone a long way, in my opinion, to accept that strategy of victory and to take steps to implement it. There is going to be greatly increased unity—political, economic, military—a greatly increased pooling and coordination of our resources, greater consultation to assure greater unity of policy. By doing that together we shall also be able to preserve our liberties and not be forced to make ourselves over in the image of that which we hate and which we want to change.

I believe that this meeting will prove historic in that sense. It has not done anything sensational. The kind of thing I am talking about doesn't make headlines; but, nevertheless, the kind of things that I am talking about, the things that have been talked about at this conference, and the unity of purpose which has been created—or, if you will, re-created at this conference in terms of a definite strategy to be carried on not just within ourselves but with other free countries during the years to come—that, I think, will make this conference significant and historic.

It is appropriate that this great forward step in establishing and preparing to implement the strategy of victory should have taken place in this city of Paris, which has for so long been identified in the minds of all peoples as the home of freedom, the dignity of man. We rejoice that we came here. We rejoice that perhaps we have been able while here to add one more chapter to the long history of the glorious contribution which France has made to the benefit of mankind.

The Strength of Free Men

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*¹

As 1957 draws to a close, there is much for which we can be thankful. The free world has stayed united in the face of many threats and allurements. Within the Sino-Soviet world there is ample evidence of discontent and of a desire of the peoples for more independence and the enjoyment of freedom.

Although there is no warrant for complacency, we can look forward to the New Year with confidence in ourselves and our allies, and in the course we are following together. The future will not be without difficulties, but with faith in God and with the strength of free men, we shall attain our objective—a just and enduring peace for mankind.

U.S.-French Air Agreement Talks

The Department of State announced on December 21 (press release 674 dated December 20) that conversations had taken place at Washington from December 10 to 20, at the request of the Government of France, between a French delegation and representatives of the American Government in order to bring about a certain number of modifications of the schedules of routes annexed to the Franco-American Air Agreement of 1946, of which article 13 (b) envisages that either party may at any time request consultation with the other with a view to initiating any amendments of the agreement or its annex which may be desirable in the light of experience.

The two delegations, after having carried out a wide exchange of views in a spirit of mutual understanding, were unable to arrive at an agreement. Under these conditions they have agreed to consult their respective governments and solicit new instructions.

The United States delegation was headed by Livingston Satterthwaite, former director of the Office of Transport and Communications, Depart-

ment of State. The French delegation was headed by Augustin Jordan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²

Uranium Prospecting in Brazil

Press release 680 dated December 26

The Governments of the United States of America and the United States of Brazil on December 26 exchanged notes concluding an agreement on a 2-year joint cooperative program for the reconnaissance and investigation of the uranium resources of Brazil. This agreement replaces an earlier one of August 3, 1955,³ and provides for the continued cooperation of United States geologists with the Brazilian Government for the purpose of discovering, appraising, and evaluating uranium resources in Brazil.

This agreement represents further evidence of the continuing close cooperation between the United States and Brazil, the largest nation in Latin America, for the mutual development of the free world's resources. It complements other agreements between the two countries designed to promote the development of atomic energy for peaceful uses.

The notes were exchanged by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., and Ambassador Ernani do Amaral Peixoto of Brazil.

Prime Minister of Laos To Visit United States

Press release 676 dated December 23

Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Laos, is expected to arrive at Washington on January 13, 1958, for a 3-day informal visit.

While in Washington the Prime Minister will have discussions with officials of the U.S. Government on problems of mutual interest to the two countries.

¹ For names of members of U.S. and French delegations, see BULLETIN of Dec. 30, 1957, p. 1037.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3385.

³ Issued to the New York *Telegram and Sun* (press release 682 dated Dec. 28).

Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries

Following are three statements made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) and one made in the plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly by Walter H. Judd, U.S. Representative, together with a press statement released by Mr. Judd and the text of a resolution on economic development adopted unanimously on December 14.

STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 5

U.S. delegation press release 2793

Let me say at the outset that the United States Government remains firmly committed to the support of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. It is also convinced that the program should continue to grow. In this connection may I point out that, although the United States Congress this year substantially reduced its appropriations for several of the items in the various aid programs being carried on by my country, it appropriated the whole of the amount requested for the United States contribution to the United Nations Expanded Program.

No one who has listened to the statements made here, particularly by those countries which are benefiting directly from the work of the technical assistance program, could fail to be impressed with the significant achievements and the still greater potential of this international undertaking. I have, myself, long been convinced that the sharing of technical skills and knowledge on a worldwide basis is a vital and indispensable element in the economic development of the less advanced countries. During the 10 years I lived and practiced medicine in rural areas in the Far East, I had many opportunities to observe at first hand the

great need of peoples in the economically less advanced countries for knowledge of modern techniques to help them in their struggle against poverty, illiteracy, and disease.

It was because of that personal experience that I proposed the first program of technical assistance that my Government established anywhere outside Latin America. In 1948, a year before the point 4 program, my proposal was enacted into law as the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in China. Unfortunately it had only a few months to operate on the mainland of China, but it was transferred to Taiwan, where spectacular results have been accomplished in improving the well-being of the people in health, education, land reform, agricultural and industrial development, and public administration.

As a physician I am perhaps particularly sensitive to the inroads which disease makes upon the economic capabilities of the individual. I am, at the same time, keenly aware of the miracles that modern medical science can perform and of the fundamental changes which it can make in people's lives, if only the knowledge and skills which exist today can be made available to those who need them. I have been greatly impressed by what has been achieved to this end through the participation of the World Health Organization in the Expanded Program. Obviously even greater opportunities lie ahead of us for bringing to all peoples the benefits of modern medical and health practices.

For example, perhaps the greatest single economic burden which the world must bear is the many millions of people who are unable to work for months out of a year because of malaria. Control and eradication of this disease is one of our

brightest hopes in the field of public health, provided peoples get together and act rapidly enough. The development of resistance to insecticides by malaria-carrying mosquitoes, however, has made it urgent that the world eradicate malaria completely within the next few years, if it is to be done at all with existing techniques. For this reason my country has joined to help develop and finance a worldwide attack on this problem in concert with the World Health Organization and the Pan American Sanitary Organization.

I hope this committee will forgive me if I have tended to concentrate my attention on the importance of technical assistance in the field of health. Not for one moment would I wish to imply that technical assistance in other fields is not equally essential and valuable.

Take, for example, the work being done under the Expanded Program by the World Meteorological Organization. Most of us think of meteorology only when we read the weather forecast in our daily newspapers. Yet the very direct bearing which that science may have on the economic development of underdeveloped areas was impressed upon me when I read, in the eighth annual report of the Technical Assistance Board,¹ of the work which the World Meteorological Organization is doing on the potato blight in Chile. It is a fascinating story of how man's increased knowledge of climatic influences can be used to control plant diseases which, at one time in the last century, caused devastation and widespread famine. I cite this account as an example of the many projects being carried on throughout the world by the Expanded Technical Assistance Program which never reach the headlines but which are significant in raising the standards of living in areas where such improvement is most urgently needed.

This is equally the case with projects being carried on in the field of public administration, on which the Director General of the Technical Assistance Administration has reported to this committee. The United States was one of the governments that supported further work in this field, which is of particular importance to countries which have recently become independent. We are gratified that such good use has been made of additional funds which were voted for this purpose last year by the General Assembly.

¹ U.N. doc. E/2842 (E/TAC/Rep/66), E/TAC/Rep/68.

ECOSOC Recommendations

May I turn now to some of the actions taken last summer in Geneva by the Economic and Social Council which directly affect the future of this program. The Economic and Social Council adopted, among others, a resolution dealing with the importance of coordinating the U.N. Expanded Program with other programs of technical and economic assistance. It also adopted a resolution requesting the Technical Assistance Board to examine the provision of technical assistance under the Expanded Program on a payment basis, as a supplement to the assistance normally rendered under the program.

Because both the financial and the technical resources available to governments for carrying on programs of economic development are obviously limited, the United States has always encouraged full cooperation among the various programs of economic and technical assistance now being carried on both through and outside the United Nations. It has stressed particularly the role of the recipient country in coordinating the different programs from which it receives assistance, so as to make the best possible use of the resources available to it, both domestically and from foreign sources. My Government is convinced that the resolution adopted by the Economic and Social Council places no undue burden on recipient governments. On the contrary, it simply encourages them to continue essential efforts in this direction in order to derive the greatest possible benefit from the use of all the available resources.

The idea of providing technical assistance to governments on a payment basis, upon request by the government concerned, in order to spread technical skills more rapidly than would be possible solely on the basis of the financial resources of the Expanded Program is not new. This arrangement has already been utilized by some of the agencies participating in the Expanded Technical Assistance Program, as has been mentioned by Mr. Keenleyside² in his opening statement to this committee. We congratulate those governments which have sought in this way to supplement the technical assistance otherwise available to them. My delegation believes that this type of arrangement

² Hugh L. Keenleyside, Director General of the U.N. Technical Assistance Administration.

is susceptible to substantial enlargement—and this is important—without detracting from the principles on which the Expanded Program now operates. Extension of assistance on a payment basis would not be designed to exclude countries from technical assistance financed under the Expanded Program. Rather, it would be additional to such assistance.

We think, therefore, that the adoption by the Economic and Social Council of the resolution on this subject was a constructive step, opening up possibilities of still greater contributions to economic development by the technical services of the program. We hope that participating agencies and governments alike will give earnest study to this method of accelerating economic development. We look forward to the report requested of the Technical Assistance Board by ECOSOC with interest and anticipation.

Question of Priorities

I also wish to emphasize once again the importance which my Government attaches to the efforts by the Technical Assistance Board to make the most efficient use of the resources of the Expanded Program by giving priority to the most urgent requirements. The question raised by the Technical Assistance Board in its eighth annual report with respect to the policy of concentrating future program developments on the neediest countries and territories is an important one. In the view of my delegation the answer to this question by any responsible body could hardly be otherwise than affirmative, particularly in view of the special needs of those countries which have recently achieved independence.

If the financial and technical resources of the Expanded Program were unlimited, the responsibility, which falls in the first instance on the Technical Assistance Board, of allocating resources where the needs and opportunities are greatest would not exist. That situation would, of course, constitute the millennium, short of which this responsibility, while it may be painful, cannot be avoided.

It is, of course, as clear to this committee as it was to the Economic and Social Council that the program's technical capabilities are greater than its present financial resources. For this reason the resolution on the possibility of increasing the financial resources of the Expanded Program,

which was adopted at the last session of the Economic and Social Council in connection with its consideration of the report on *A Forward Look*^a merits our study and support.

In the Expanded Program we have, on the one hand, a proven instrument of economic and social progress. On the other hand, there is a demonstrated need for additional financial resources. My Government shares the hope, implicit in the resolution of the Economic and Social Council, that the resources annually available to the Expanded Program can be increased to \$50 million. Even this amount would, we realize, not exhaust the possibilities of making available to underdeveloped countries what has been described as "technical assistance in depth." If we look beyond the level of \$50 million, we can see possibilities for expanding the scope of United Nations technical assistance into areas where further and very important contributions could be made to economic development. Such an expansion of the program would, of course, require a relatively large outlay for supplies and equipment and would raise new problems of financing and operation. My delegation will take up this issue and make concrete proposals for this committee's consideration at a later stage in this session.

So far as the present program is concerned, it is not my intention to suggest to any other country represented here what it should do with respect to contributions to the Expanded Program. I should, however, like to suggest that the success of this or any other program undertaken by the United Nations in the field of economic development depends upon adequate financial support by all countries. The United States will continue to do its part, but a failure to achieve growth of the Expanded Program on a truly multilateral basis will not, in my opinion, augur well for any new multilateral efforts in the economic field.

We were pleased to note that, at the eighth pledging conference on October 10, 21 governments increased their pledged contributions for 1958 over those of 1957. This was a heartening demonstration of the support which the program enjoys in those countries. It is this kind of support which will make it clear that the Expanded Program is not in fact a program of any one

^a U.N. doc. E/2885 (E/TAC/49).

country or of a special group of countries but a worldwide United Nations program in the truest sense. It is only in this way that the program will be able to develop its maximum potential not only for economic advancement but also for human understanding and genuinely cooperative international relations. This challenge can and must be met.

STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 18

U.S. delegation press release 2813

For the last several years the United Nations has been studying the question of whether, and under what conditions, it should establish a new United Nations fund to help finance economic development. I intend to direct my statement to this proposal and, in this connection, to make completely clear the position of my Government on the question of economic assistance to underdeveloped countries.

The first point I want to make is this: It is an essential element of the foreign policy of the United States, affirmed both by the President and by the Congress, to assist the economic development of the less developed countries. What we want is simply to make the most constructive and effective contribution that we can to the efforts of the people of these countries to achieve rapid social and economic progress. This desire reflects, in part, the natural impulse of all decent human beings to help others. In part, it represents the traditional response of the American people to the needs of nations that have long striven for and recently won their independence—a response whose roots run back to the beginnings of our own history as an independent country. Beyond this we hold that our support for the economic development of the less developed countries is in our own national interest.

I am firmly convinced that the basic interests of the peoples of both the developed and underdeveloped countries are essentially the same. It is clearly in the interest of the United States, as well as that of the underdeveloped countries themselves, that weak or unstable economies grow into societies self-reliant and sturdy enough to raise their standard of living, promote human welfare, and make their full contribution to the maintenance of freedom and peace.

To the extent that we can help the underdeveloped countries achieve their objective through our contributions to their efforts, whether these contributions are made through the United Nations or directly, our own objectives are achieved and our own interests fully served. This was recognized by the Congress when it declared: "The Congress of the United States recognizes that the progress of free peoples in their efforts to further their economic development and thus to strengthen their freedom is important to the security and general welfare of the United States."

U.S. Bilateral Programs

My second point: No one will deny that the Government and people of the United States have lived up to their convictions. We have, since the end of World War II, endeavored to accomplish these foreign-policy objectives by making assistance available to underdeveloped countries in substantial amounts and in many forms.

We have engaged in an extensive program of technical cooperation.

We have provided loan capital through our Export-Import Bank for agriculture, industry, and basic public works to help provide the foundation for increasing national wealth and welfare in many countries.

For the last 5 years the Congress has appropriated several hundred million dollars each year to finance development projects in underdeveloped countries that could not be financed from private sources or by normal banking institutions.

We have tried to use our surplus agricultural commodities constructively in ways that would help to promote economic development without interfering with normal marketings of the United States or of other countries.

We have taken measures to encourage private capital to flow into productive investment overseas.

Through our atoms-for-peace program we are helping to finance research reactors and provide scientific training to enable less developed countries to enjoy the benefits of nuclear science.

These are the so-called bilateral programs in which, at the request of other countries, we have engaged and which we are prepared to continue. Perhaps it is in order to point out that, in the long list of countries to which these programs have been extended, there are many which do not

necessarily share our views on political issues or on economic philosophy.

We are also participating in regional programs to help promote economic development—specifically the Organization of American States and the Colombo Plan.

U.S. Participation in Multilateral Programs

We have also given full support to multilateral programs in the economic and social fields undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations.

More than 10 years ago we joined with other countries to establish at Bretton Woods the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

We are members of and strongly support the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, UNESCO, and the other specialized agencies whose work is of great value to the underdeveloped countries.

In 1949 we took the initiative in promoting the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program.

More recently we helped to establish the International Finance Corporation to promote private investment in underdeveloped countries.

We look forward to and will fully support the constructive work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which President Eisenhower first proposed to the General Assembly 4 years ago.

These aid programs—bilateral, regional, and multilateral—are an integral part of the fabric of our international relations. In addition to more than \$3 billion contributed to international organizations working in the economic field, we have made available as economic aid to underdeveloped countries over \$11 billion since the end of World War II. This assistance has been given despite the heavy burden of defense which our people were compelled to assume when the Soviet Union failed to reduce its armaments, as my country did, at the end of the last World War and, instead, supported aggressive action against the independence of a series of sovereign nations. This amount does not include aid which we have given for postwar reconstruction or for military assistance to countries requesting it. That military assistance has also brought substantial economic benefits. It has given to the countries thus

assisted a measure of security and assurances of peaceful development which are enabling them to build up and develop their economies in freedom and without fear that they will become victims of military aggression.

The third point I wish to make is this: The United States Government is searching continuously for additional effective ways and means to achieve our common goal of economic progress. We are always prepared to consider favorably new ways which give real promise of assisting the development of underdeveloped countries. In the United Nations we have joined in exploring the problems of financing economic development and the possibilities of establishing new institutions in this field. Last year the Congress invited groups of distinguished private citizens to consider ways in which the United States might make more effective its economic aid to the vast underdeveloped areas of the world. The Congress studied their reports and made significant modifications in various United States aid programs.

U.S. Development Loan Fund

The most important of these modifications was the establishment by the last session of Congress of a new element in our program of assistance to underdeveloped countries, namely, the Development Loan Fund. It is designed to be the principal bilateral means by which the United States can help finance development projects that cannot be financed from such sources as private investment, our Export-Import Bank, the International Bank, or the International Finance Corporation. I should, therefore, like to describe briefly how this fund will be used to supplement the efforts of the underdeveloped countries.

The Development Loan Fund has for its initial operations an appropriation of \$300 million to establish a revolving loan fund. In addition, the Congress has authorized the appropriation for fiscal year 1959 of an additional \$625 million for use by the fund to help meet the continuing requirements of economic development. The fund is now ready to consider proposals for specific projects in the less developed countries. The fund will consider not only projects that will contribute directly to increased production in such fields as agriculture, manufacturing, or mining but also such basic facilities as highways, power, and

transportation, which frequently constitute the limiting factors for sound development. Loans from the fund will generally be extended on more flexible terms than those of existing lending institutions, for example, loans repayable over a longer period of time or repayable in local currency, should the circumstances so warrant.

The fund will, of course, work closely with existing financial institutions to help meet the needs of underdeveloped countries.

To help promote private investment, the fund is authorized to guarantee loans from private sources for economic development purposes. It may also associate itself with private investors in financing specific projects. It may help finance local development banks which would make loans to private enterprises. We feel this aspect of the fund's operations is to be particularly important in the light of the fact that the funds available from the tax revenues of capital-exporting countries can meet only a fraction of the local requirements of economic development around the world.

The Development Loan Fund does not, of course, have unlimited funds at its disposal. The future of the fund will largely depend on the extent to which sound projects will in fact be forthcoming for which other sources of finance are unavailable. As a member of the United States Congress, I venture to predict that the question of its appropriating additional resources for the fund will be determined in large part by the kind of opportunities for their constructive use that develop in the future.

U.S. Views on U.N. Economic Development Fund

Mr. Chairman, the United States has given much thought to the possibility of a new United Nations fund for economic development. As the members of this committee know, the United States has for several years consistently supported the idea of an international development fund whenever circumstances will make it, in fact, practicable. Our support was made clear in resolution 724 of the Eighth General Assembly, which was adopted on the initiative of the United States delegation. My Government continues to stand by the pledge embodied in that resolution.

It remains our considered view, however, that present circumstances are not such as to make it practicable, useful, or wise to attempt to establish

such a multilateral fund at this time. The resources that countries are now prepared to make available would be totally inadequate to establish a fund of sufficient size to do the job intended for it. To establish an international economic development fund now would be to create structure without substance. It would raise hopes among the peoples of the underdeveloped countries that could not be fulfilled. The limited resources that the fund could command under existing conditions would inevitably be scattered and, to a considerable extent, dissipated on relatively minor projects everywhere in the world without real impact on the development process anywhere.

There is no magic in a new name or new machinery. What is needed is additional substance. The time to establish a new international capital fund to help provide large additional financing for strengthening the economic and social structure of the less developed countries is when many nations are able to commit themselves to provide substantial, usable resources on a continuing basis, for a continuing and long-term job. To establish a new international development fund which we know at the start would be inadequate to do its global job would neither add to the strength or prestige of the United Nations nor add appreciably to the economic strength and vitality of its member nations.

Because it touches intimately upon problems of human suffering and human happiness, the proposal for a great new program of action through the United Nations must naturally arouse the enthusiasm of anyone sensitive to human misery. But if the vision of a great new effort by the United Nations to aid the underdeveloped countries with capital investment funds is to be more than unfulfilled promise, it cannot disregard the economic and political realities out of which it is to be born and in which it must live. For this reason, difficult though the decision has been for us and disappointing as I know it is for others, my Government continues to be convinced that, under existing conditions, it must oppose this proposal. To adopt it at this time, we believe, would be both self-deceiving and self-defeating.

Let me make it completely clear that the United States is not prepared at this time to support the establishment of a special United Nations capital fund. The United States will vote against any resolution introduced at this session

to establish such a fund, and we shall not participate in any preparatory commission that might be established now to draft the charter of such a fund. I state the United States position on this question as clearly as possible so that members of this committee will not consider this issue under the impression that the United States position is uncertain or wavering. Our position flows logically from our considered view that a United Nations capital fund could not now fulfill its promise or begin to do the job envisaged for it.

Proposal To Enlarge U.N. Technical Assistance Program

This is not, however, the sum total of our thinking on this subject.

We believe that a more realistic, and therefore more constructive, approach to the problem of promoting economic development through the United Nations would be to use the additional resources that countries may be prepared to make available at this time to support a substantial enlargement, both in size and in scope, of the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program.

The Expanded Technical Assistance Program is doing an important job well, but it is hampered by a shortage of funds. It tries to be responsive to reasonable government requests over the whole range of economic and social activities, and it undoubtedly has greatly contributed to economic development. However, its efforts have been scattered and not sufficiently supported by basic programs essential for economic progress. It has been unable—for lack of funds—to do a concentrated, systematic, and sustained job in such basic fields as survey of natural resources, industrial research, and training essential to economic growth.

Countries everywhere are making plans for economic development, but all too often they do not yet know just what their resources are, what minerals lie in the ground, what are their water resources, their industrial potential, or even their manpower resources. When the United States representative returned this past summer from an ECAFE Working Party on Assessment of Hydroelectric Potential, he reported that a recurring theme at the meeting was the fact that many of the countries of the ECAFE region were hampered by the paucity of basic data on rainfall, runoff, and topography; they were handicapped by lack of funds for investigations and still further hand-

icapped by lack of trained and experienced technical personnel. The report of the Technical Assistance Board on *A Forward Look* recognizes the same problem. I quote from this report: "Few underdeveloped countries have inventories of their natural resources or the institutions necessary to develop these inventories." Surely, concentrated and systematic aid in surveying basic resources is of first importance to economic development.

Even where countries know what their resources are, they need help in determining the best uses to make of these resources. Research and experimentation in new and effective ways to use the materials at hand are the essence of economic development—how to use indigenous products for new industries; how to convert sugarcane bagasse into building board of high tensile strength; how to turn waste products to economic use. Industrial research and productivity centers can help countries make effective use of the resources at hand.

We believe it is possible to achieve rapid increases in agricultural productivity by the use of relatively simple and inexpensive technological improvements. Stepped-up agricultural research and demonstration projects and associated extension services are fundamental to economic development.

Of particular importance is the preparation of technical personnel. Greatly enlarged facilities are required for technological education, vocational training, and advances in basic literacy. Where we now train hundreds, we should train thousands. With technology making great strides forward, all countries must give more and more stress to making educational facilities available on the widest possible basis.

Other fields of fundamental importance to sound economic planning and development, such as public administration and basic statistics, are suggested in chapter III of the report of TAB, *A Forward Look*.

Special Projects Fund

What, then, do we propose? We propose that the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program be substantially increased, that it be enlarged from its present level of about \$30 million up to \$100 million a year. Part of the increase would be used to continue and extend existing types of programs, particularly in the newly

established countries. With the remainder we would suggest that a Special Projects Fund be established as an integral part of the Expanded Program and earmarked for such technical development projects as will provide concentration in depth on surveys, research, and training projects of basic importance to successful economic growth. This Special Projects Fund would help finance systematic surveys of basic resources, the equipping and staffing of regional technological institutes, research and productivity centers, and agricultural research projects. While the United Nations Technical Assistance Program operates in these fields in a limited and piecemeal way, this new fund would enable the United Nations to give systematic assistance in these fields, to support projects that are more costly and require more sustained assistance. Such a fund could well give priority to projects within these basic fields that would have the widest impact, to regional institutes and training facilities of a permanent nature from which several neighboring countries could benefit, to surveys of water resources affecting several countries.

The enlarged fund would be financed by voluntary contributions on a matching basis. A congressional mandate adopted this year requires that the United States share in the Expanded Program be reduced from its present level of 45 percent to 38 percent next year and 33 1/3 percent thereafter. I cannot speak for the United States Congress any more than most of you can speak for your legislative bodies. But I can speak in my personal capacity as an elected representative of the American people, and I believe this enlarged fund can be of such benefit to my own country, as well as to all other countries that are striving to maintain their independence and to improve the well-being of their peoples, that I am prepared to go before the Congress and urge that it stabilize the percentage of our contribution at 40 percent for at least several years. My colleagues in the Congress know that this represents a reversal of my previous position. I believe that, together with like-minded Members, we can show the Congress why it would be wise to adopt such a proposal.

Such an enlarged technical assistance program, even with its Special Projects Fund, would not do the job envisaged for an international capital fund such as that proposed in the draft resolu-

tion contained in document L.331.⁴ It would not build bridges, dams, roads, powerplants, or houses; the capital required for that kind of job far exceeds the resources governments are now prepared or able to make available. Nor would it do a blueprinting and engineering job. Rather, it would do the more basic work of helping countries in a sustained and systematic way to train their manpower and assess and use their resources more productively.

The United States is not alone in regarding this basic work as a project of first priority. The replies of many countries which have commented on *A Forward Look* deplore the inadequate financial resources of the United Nations technical assistance program and emphasize the importance of concentrating on certain fundamental fields of activity. In its reply the Government of Pakistan observed, "The technical assistance needs far exceed the financial resources." They "are not commensurate with the magnitude of the problem."

The Government of Yugoslavia in its reply said: "It is a well-known fact that underdeveloped countries are greatly in need of surveys of basic resources, of industrial training and productivity centres, of agricultural research and demonstration projects, as well as of wide-spread development of technological training institutions; in fact such projects are essential elements of development plans and are in many cases preliminary steps upon which the successful carrying out of productive investments depends. Such expansion of United Nations assistance should therefore be one of the next important steps in the field of United Nations economic activities."

The Government of Argentina at a recent session of the Economic and Social Council suggested that emphasis should be put on the establishment of regional technological institutes and on surveys of basic resources. This is the type of constructive suggestion to which we feel the United Nations should give effect at this time.

In the light of these considerations my Government is convinced that a substantial and rapid enlargement of both the financial resources and

⁴ U.N. doc. A/C. 2/L.331, a draft resolution establishing a U.N. Economic Development Fund, sponsored by Argentina, Ceylon, Chile, Egypt, Greece, India, Indonesia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

scope of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance would constitute the most constructive step possible today to provide, within the framework of the United Nations, greater assistance to the less developed countries.

We have, therefore, submitted a draft resolution⁵ under which this Assembly would appoint a preparatory committee charged with the following tasks: first, to define the basic fields and within these fields the types of projects to be eligible for assistance from the Special Projects Fund; second, to consider the changes which may need to be made in the present administration and machinery of the technical assistance program to assure speedy and effective use of this fund; third, to ascertain the extent to which governments would be willing to contribute to the enlarged technical assistance program, with an indication of the amount they would be prepared to earmark, should they so desire, specifically for the Special Projects Fund out of their increased contributions; and, finally, to prepare the necessary amendments to the legislation and procedures which currently govern the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. In all this work we hope that the committee will be able to benefit from the expert advice of consultants made available by the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies. The preparatory committee would submit its report and recommendations to the 26th session of ECOSOC and, through ECOSOC, to the 13th session of the General Assembly in 1958 for final action.

In the view of my Government this proposal is both realistic and constructive. Its dimensions are realistic in terms of what countries would appear to be able to make available over the next several years; and the job can be undertaken largely within the framework of existing United Nations machinery. The task itself is basic and fundamental to economic growth. It is the hope of my Government that other member nations will join with us to carry it out.

In conclusion, let me say a word to those of our friends who have put so much thought and effort into plans for the establishment of an international capital investment fund, whether it is called SUNFED or something else. I know that what I am proposing falls short of your hopes and de-

sires. I submit, however, that, even if it were possible to establish SUNFED immediately, it would be necessary in many countries first of all to undertake the kind of projects which we envisage under our proposal. What is more, the program I have outlined for you, if accepted by this General Assembly, will, I am convinced, facilitate in the years to come new capital investments of all types—private and public, national and international—by creating conditions which will make such investments either feasible or more effective. It will thus help to increase the flow of capital resources to the underdeveloped countries, the need for which we are the first to recognize.

For all these reasons I commend the United States proposal to you for your sympathetic consideration. We believe that, in the words of Ambassador Lodge, "War can be deterred for periods of time by military strength. Peace can be built only by nonmilitary means." We believe this is a sound and workable program to help build peace. It is within the realm of practicability and would be of great benefit to all.

STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 27

U.S. delegation press release 2824

I am grateful for this opportunity to intervene in order to answer questions raised thus far in our debate regarding the United States proposal in draft resolution L. 354.

Two significant questions were raised by the distinguished representative of Japan. First, what role, if any, would the Special Projects Fund play in the middle ground between basic research into the natural resources of underdeveloped countries and the actual beginning of economic development projects. He recognized, for example, that in connection with a water resource survey the fund's experts would obviously not be authorized to prepare blueprints for an individual dam to be constructed; but, he asked, would they be able to put forward a general plan for development on the basis of which investment possibilities could be studied, even though the fund itself would not participate in the financing of the project?

Under our resolution, Mr. Chairman, it would be the job of the Preparatory Committee to determine how far such surveys will go. Moreover,

⁵ U. N. doc. A/C.2/L. 354.

even after general determinations have been made by the committee, specific decisions as to the precise content of each project will have to be made on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, I can state that, in the view of our delegation, the answer to the question is, yes. We think that basic surveys might properly include general plans or suggestions for development, while not going into specific blueprints for individual construction projects nor into the financing of such projects.

The second question raised by the distinguished delegate of Japan concerned what expenditures by a receiving country are to be counted as contributions to the proposed fund. The United States view is that these should be on the same basis as contributions to the present Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. As is known, local costs paid by recipient governments amount to about two and one-half times as much as the foreign-exchange contributions of contributing governments. It is difficult to foresee at this time whether local costs under the Special Projects Fund will be proportionately greater or less than under the present program. For such projects as research institutes involving the contribution of very expensive equipment, it may be that the proportion of local costs will be less than under the present program. On other projects the proportion might be more. In these circumstances, the United States believes the present formula should be retained, and our proposal is offered on that basis.

Reply to Soviet Questions

Let me turn now to the questions raised by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. First, he asked whether the United States would contribute to the fund if other countries do not. Mr. Chairman, what we have proposed is a multilateral United Nations fund. Obviously such a fund can be successful only if the members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies support it. The United States is only one member. As clearly stated in our proposal, we are prepared to do our part provided other members join us in assuring the success of this proposal. No one who knows the record of United States support for United Nations institutions can doubt our sincerity in this. May I refer this committee to pages 46 and 47 of document E/3047 concerning contributions of governments to United Na-

tions technical assistance and relief agencies during the period 1954-1956. You will see that the United States contributed \$164 million out of a total of \$280 million. The Soviet Union, I note, contributed about \$6 million during this period, roughly the same as Australia.

Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, document E/3047 gives no information about bilateral assistance programs of the Soviet Union although it appears to discuss virtually all other bilateral economic-assistance programs of any significance. I should appreciate information from the Secretariat as to the reasons for this omission.

Secondly, the Soviet representative asked what basis there is for the United States to assume that other countries are prepared to contribute more funds and to bring the total up to \$100 million. Mr. Chairman, this target figure was established in the light of sums that countries have indicated they would be willing to make available for other United Nations assistance programs. It is impossible to tell at this time how big the fund will be. That is why our draft resolution would instruct the Preparatory Committee to determine how much the interested governments would be able and willing to contribute. On a preliminary basis we have been most encouraged in this respect by the statements of the Danish, French, and other representatives before this committee. The United States hopes that the total amount of \$100 million may be attained in 1959, and it is prepared to contribute to a fund of such size in its just proportion. But we will, of course, contribute to a smaller fund, for example, \$75 million, if that is the maximum that can be supported in any given year on a multilateral basis. Any substantial increase, even though it fell short of \$100 million per year, would make a constructive and important contribution to economic development in the less developed countries. Let no one doubt, therefore, that in advancing this proposal the United States is completely sincere both as to its aims and to its target.

Thirdly, the Soviet representative asked why the fund proposed in the 11-power draft resolution^a and that proposed by the United States could not develop in parallel. Theoretically there would be no obstacle to such parallel development if sufficient funds were available to do both. But,

^a U.N. doc. A/C.2/L.331.

since we know that is not the case, it seems to us wise to concentrate on what appears to be a realistic goal for the immediate future. We note that this viewpoint has also been expressed by other delegations in this debate. This does not mean that our proposal is an alternative to SUNFED or the economic development fund proposed in draft resolution L. 331. As I said in my initial statement, the United States is convinced that under existing circumstances the difficulties in the way of establishing an adequate capital development fund on the basis of fairly proportioned contributions by member nations appear to be insurmountable. In the United States view, a realistic program for the United Nations until these difficulties are overcome is to undertake the technical assistance in depth which is basic to economic development. We are convinced that this job can be done successfully if the member nations support it fully. If I may repeat, Mr. Chairman, what I said in my initial statement [November 18]: "The program I have outlined for you, if accepted by this General Assembly, will, I am convinced, facilitate in the years to come new capital investments of all types—private and public, national and international—by creating conditions which will make such investments either feasible or more effective. It will thus help to increase the flow of capital resources to underdeveloped countries, the need for which we are the first to recognize."

The fourth question asked by the Soviet representative was whether it was true that the United States would decrease its contribution from 60 percent to 33 percent at present. Putting the question in this form is a complete distortion of the facts. In fact, the initial United States contribution to the Expanded Program in 1950 was \$12 million, which amounted at that time to 60 percent of the total. Let us recall that this was at a time when most other major industrial countries were still recovering from the effects of the war. The United States contribution offered this year has increased to \$15½ million, subject to the proviso that this shall not exceed 45 percent of the total program. Under existing legislation of the U.S. Congress, this percentage contribution to the Expanded Program would decline to 38 percent in 1959 and 33½ percent thereafter. It is difficult to understand the reason for the Soviet representative's question, since I set this all out clearly in

my initial statement. I also said the following: "I believe this enlarged fund can be of such benefit to my own country, as well as to all other countries that are striving to maintain their independence and to improve the well-being of their peoples, that I am prepared to go before the Congress and urge that it stabilize the percentage of our contribution at 40 percent for at least several years. My colleagues in the Congress know that this represents a reversal of my previous position. I believe that, together with many like-minded Members, we can show the Congress why it would be wise to adopt such a proposal."

Reply to Indonesian Questions

I should next like to refer to the significant questions raised by the distinguished representative of Indonesia. He asked whether the United States refusal to support the 11-power draft resolution meant that our proposal was considered to be a substitute for SUNFED. I want to reiterate that such is definitely not the case. Regardless of the decision taken by this committee on the United States proposal, my Government would find it impossible to support the establishment of a capital development fund at this time. We continue to support the principle of the establishment of such a fund when circumstances give promise of its attaining a meaningful size in terms of the capital needs of the less developed countries. We cannot anticipate exactly when this time will come. Consequently, rather than fold our hands and give a solemn but meaningless blessing, we have made a proposal which we consider both constructive and important to the economic development of less developed countries. It is not a substitute for SUNFED. It is not an alternative to SUNFED. It is not an attempt to exclude the future development of SUNFED. What happens to SUNFED depends on future circumstances which we cannot foresee or control. We make our proposal on its own merits, in the belief that it offers reasonable hope of making an effective contribution now to economic development.

The Indonesian representative also asked whether the figure of \$100 million is to be considered a minimum. The answer is definitely no. The United States considers such a target feasible and desirable but will support on a matching basis any increase in funds for technical assist-

ance and technical development. We recognize that, if at first the figure might be perhaps only \$75 million, still a great amount of good would be accomplished.

The representative of Indonesia pointed out that under part C of the annex to draft resolution L.331 recipient countries would pay part of the cost of projects undertaken. As he justly emphasized, this greatly increases the potential impact of any such fund. I should therefore like to note that such participation by beneficiary countries would also be an integral part of the United States proposal.

May I express to the distinguished representative of Indonesia, which is one of the sponsors of L.331, my sincere appreciation for the open-minded and cooperative spirit in which he has examined the United States proposal. My delegation has been pleased to notice a similarly sympathetic attitude on the part of the Yugoslav delegation and other cosponsors of draft resolution L.331. This gives us the hope that before our deliberations are finished this committee will be able to agree on a constructive program for effective action in this field.

Reply to Bulgarian Questions

Finally I should like to comment briefly on the intervention of the Bulgarian representative. He alleged that the enlargement of technical assistance and technical development envisaged in the United States proposal is illusory. This charge follows the line suggested by the questions of the Soviet representative, a coincidence which is not altogether surprising. Since I have already replied to the Soviet question, there is obviously no need to discuss the Bulgarian allegation. As to the good faith of the United States in supporting multilateral development programs under the United Nations, I refer the Bulgarian representative to pages 46 and 47 of document E/3047. I do not note there any contribution from Bulgaria. I hope this is merely the result of the newness of the Bulgarian membership in the United Nations. Perhaps such newness also explains the apparent unfamiliarity of the Bulgarian representative with the history of previous initiatives taken by the United States in the economic field in the United Nations.

Somehow the Bulgarian representative has also read into my remarks the notion that the

United States wants all investment to be private. A reading of my statement would certainly contradict most emphatically any such assertion. I pointed out that the United States, since the end of the last war, has contributed more than \$3 billion to international organizations working in the economic field and has made available as direct economic aid to the governments of the less developed countries over \$11 billion during that period. I think there are few countries represented here which would not acknowledge that the United States has made by far the largest contribution in economic aid on a government-to-government basis of any country in the world. I also pointed out that the Congress has continued to appropriate hundreds of millions of dollars each year to finance development projects in undeveloped countries that could not be financed from private sources or by normal banking institutions. Moreover, the Congress at its last session established the Development Loan Fund to finance just this type of project. If any representative here wishes further information on United States performance in the field of government economic assistance, he has only to refer to document E/3047.

I would be the first to emphasize, however, that my Government is convinced that a much greater role could be played by private capital in the financing of economic development. The representative of Mexico on Monday stressed the predominant role played by private capital in the rapid development of the Mexican economy. My own country owes its economic growth principally to the dynamic power of free enterprise and private capital; so naturally we believe in it, though we have always recognized at the same time the role of the government in developing infrastructure and in assisting private enterprise. It is the combination that has worked so successfully with us; so of course we recommend that to our friends.

In this connection I should like to quote briefly from the remarks made October 18, 1957, at the International Industrial Development Conference by the Honorable M. R. Masani, Member of Parliament of the Government of India. After outlining the role of government financing in promoting economic development, Mr. Masani declared:

I should be failing in frankness if I were not to share with you my own feeling that, of all the forms of foreign

investment, equity capital will go the farthest as a factor suited to rectify the balance of our mixed economy and the processes of our economic thought. Private capital may not only serve as a bridge between the resources of the West and the needs of the East, but may help in bringing economic stability and progress to underdeveloped countries, immunize them from slogans and ideologies which promise much and deliver little and save them from these terribly costly and painful experiments of totalitarian States.

It is to be hoped that, as the quantum of foreign investment in our part of the world increases, the predominant and indeed the normal shape it takes will be that of equity capital being invested in the normal course of business. Both because such a development would be free from political "strings" and Government intervention and because it will bring with it the maximum amount of people-to-people contact, an enlightened approach to labor know-how and managerial and technical skills, there can be no question that—other things being equal—such investment would be the most fruitful.

As I said in my initial statement on this subject, one of the primary aims of the United States proposal is to facilitate in the years to come new capital investments of all types, private and public, national and international. In our view the optimum development of the less developed countries will be promoted by encouraging and using all of these types of investment, not just one of them. It is in this spirit and with this aim, Mr. Chairman, that my delegation has put forth its proposal and believes it worthy of the support of other member governments.

STATEMENT IN PLENARY, DECEMBER 14

U.S. delegation press release 2848

My delegation will, of course, vote in favor of this resolution, which we had the honor of cosponsoring.

My delegation worked hard during the discussions of this item in the committee to achieve an agreement on the present resolution because it achieves two extremely important objectives.

First, it initiates further constructive action designed to assist the less developed countries in their striving for economic and social development and the achievement of improved standards of living. It adopts the United States proposal for establishment of a Special Fund by the United Nations for a new and different approach to technical assistance and technical development to help meet the basic needs of less devel-

oped countries. In this connection I should like to recall that, while the United States proposal for a Special Fund has not envisaged that the fund would be subordinated to the present machinery of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance—and in that sense would have an identity of its own—we have always made it clear, and so does the resolution, that the fund would be integrally related to the existing United Nations programs of technical assistance and would make the fullest possible use of the existing technical assistance machinery.

Second, the resolution clearly recognizes the need of the less developed countries for larger amounts of capital investment. In the preamble it makes this point by emphasizing the importance of an increased flow of capital to the less developed countries from all sources—private and public, national and international. Moreover, in section C the resolution leaves open the possibility of later action by the United Nations with respect to capital investment in the less developed countries as and when sufficient resources become prospectively available to enable it to enter into this field. As the delegates of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have pointed out, section C properly reserves until that time any decision by the General Assembly to enter into the field of capital development. Likewise, it reserves until that time the question of any commitment on the part of any government to that decision.

It should be pointed out also that nothing in this resolution authorizes the transformation into a capital development fund of the Special Fund established by the resolution for expanding existing technical assistance activities of the United Nations.

The decision by this Assembly to consider the question of what action might be appropriate with respect to a United Nations capital development fund only when sufficient resources become available is, in the view of my delegation, a reasonable, realistic, and wise decision. It is a frank recognition of the plain fact that sufficient funds are not now available, or in prospect, to establish a fund that would do more than raise hopes that could not be fulfilled. That would not be of service to anyone.

It is therefore clear that adoption of this resolution does not mean, or even suggest, any change in

the United States position of opposition to the establishment of a United Nations capital development fund at this time. That position of my Government has been made plain in my statements in the Second Committee during our discussion of this agenda item. It will continue to be the position of my Government as long as the conditions on which the position is based remain unchanged. We feel that for the United Nations to act on any less realistic basis would only lead to disappointment and disillusionment and would be a disservice to the less developed countries which are looking to the United Nations for aid.

So far as my own Government is concerned, and as my delegation has indicated repeatedly to other delegations during our prolonged discussions on this resolution, it is my Government's view that sufficient resources would be in prospect only when there is dependable evidence that financial support in the neighborhood of \$400 million to \$500 million in generally usable currencies will be available on an annual basis. As my delegation has previously indicated, and others have confirmed, this amount for capital development would have to be in addition to the sums provided for United Nations programs of technical assistance, including the Special Fund envisaged in this resolution.

It should also be made quite clear that, as and when voluntary contributions by governments become prospectively available in such amounts to make possible a multilateral fund for financing economic development, it would in the case of the United States in all likelihood involve some shifting of funds from contributions now being made for similar purposes on a bilateral basis.

We note with satisfaction the last paragraph of the preamble of the resolution which recognizes the fact that some governments are not in a position to make commitments to United Nations programs without the consent of their legislatures or on other than an annual basis. As is well known to all, I think, that is the situation in my own country.

Our support for the resolution was made possible by an agreement that the annex to the resolution would not be specifically voted upon or approved by the General Assembly, just as it was not specifically voted upon or approved by the Second Committee. As the resolution itself makes clear, the annex will have no special standing different from or superior to the views and

suggestions to be forwarded by governments to the Preparatory Committee for its consideration in recommending appropriate arrangements for the Special Fund. Neither the Preparatory Committee nor any member of it or of the United Nations is in any way bound by the principles set forth in the annex.

On the basis of these understandings, Mr. President, my delegation is happy to vote for the resolution, much of which reflects principles originally proposed by the United States. The final form was arrived at after long discussions in which there was displayed a fine spirit of fairness and conciliation in reaching agreement to go ahead with all that the United Nations is now in a position to do in this exceedingly important field. Adoption of the resolution, we believe, will be a real milestone in the development of sound programs of assistance to the less developed countries which need such assistance most. The United States will do its best in cooperation with others to translate the decisions embodied in this resolution into concrete actions which, we deeply hope and believe, will contribute substantially to helping the less developed countries achieve for their people a better life in greater freedom and thereby contribute also to the well-being of all peoples and the peace of the world.

PRESS STATEMENT, DECEMBER 13

U.S. delegation press release 2846

It is a noteworthy and dual achievement that the United Nations has unanimously accepted the United States proposal for a new and enlarged technical assistance program.

On the one hand, we are adopting a program that is within reach and will do great good at basic tasks. The United States is anxious to help the underdeveloped countries in their forward economic progress. No country has helped more in securing political independence for nations. We are equally concerned over the economic betterment of people in other countries, and particularly the new nations, because improved living conditions are essential if people are to be contented and able to maintain their political independence.

At the same time the Assembly in the resolution passed [by Committee II] last night (L. 331/Rev. 1) has accepted the United States view that it is

unwise to create a multimillion-dollar capital development fund at this time. Sufficient contributions simply are not available to secure the success of such a project. The Assembly has recognized that it would be illusory to establish an international economic development fund now whose resources would be entirely inadequate to do the job it was intended to do; this would be creating structure without substance.

What we have set up is a fund of limited objectives but one that is directed toward doing an important and vital job in paving the way for economic development which can come through capital from all sources—private and public, national and international. The unanimous vote augurs well for the success of this new initiative. Let us get on with the job.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION⁷

The General Assembly,

In conformity with the determination of the United Nations, as expressed in its Charter, to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends, to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

Conscious of the particular needs of the less developed countries for international aid in achieving accelerated development of their economic and social infrastructure,

Recalling its resolutions on the establishment of an international fund for economic development within the framework of the United Nations and, in particular, reaffirming its unanimously adopted resolution 724 A and B (VIII) of 7 December 1953,

Noting the recommendation of the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 662 B (XXIV),

Recognizing that the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Programme is of proven effectiveness in promoting the economic development of the less developed countries,

Recognizing, however, that neither the Expanded Technical Assistance Programme nor other existing programmes of the United Nations or the specialized agencies can now meet certain urgent needs which, if met, would advance the processes of technical, economic and social development of the less developed countries, and, in particular, would facilitate new capital investments of all types—private and public, national and international—by creating conditions which will make such investments either feasible or more effective,

Convinced that a rapidly achieved enlargement in the financial resources and scope of technical assistance rendered by the United Nations and the specialized agencies

to the less developed countries would constitute a constructive advance in United Nations assistance and would be of immediate significance in accelerating their economic development,

Recognizing that, while long-term pledges are desirable, some Governments are unable to make financial commitments except with the approval of their legislatures and on an annual basis,

A.

Commends the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Question of the Establishment of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development for the work embodied in its final and supplementary reports prepared in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 923 (X) of 9 December 1955 and 1030 (XI) of 26 February 1957;

B.

1. *Decides* that, subject to the conditions prescribed hereunder, there shall be established as an expansion of existing technical assistance and development activities of the United Nations and the specialized agencies a separate Special Fund which would provide systematic and sustained assistance in fields essential to the integrated technical, economic and social development of the less developed countries;

2. *Decides further* that, in view of the resources prospectively available at this time, which are not likely to exceed one hundred million dollars annually, the operations of the Fund shall be directed towards enlarging the scope of the United Nations programmes of technical assistance so as to include special projects in certain basic fields to be defined by the Preparatory Committee provided for in paragraph 4 below, for example, intensive surveys of water, mineral and potential power resources; the establishment, including staffing and equipping, of training institutes in public administration, statistics and technology, and of agricultural and industrial research and productivity centres;

3. *Considers* that while, without impairing the separate identity of the Special Fund, the fullest possible use should be made of the existing machinery of the United Nations, the specialized agencies (including the existing international financial institutions) and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, the Special Fund will require some new administrative and operational machinery;

4. *Decides* to establish a Preparatory Committee composed of representatives of sixteen Governments to do the following, taking into account the principles set out in the annex and the views and suggestions forwarded by governments pursuant to paragraph 7 below:

(a) define the basic fields of assistance which the Special Fund should encompass and, within these fields, the types of projects which should be eligible for assistance;

(b) define in the light of paragraph 3 above, the administrative and operational machinery to be recommended for the Special Fund, including such changes as may be required in the present legislation and procedures of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance;

⁷ U.N. doc. A/Res/1219 ((XII) A/C. 2/L. 331/Rev. 1, as amended); adopted unanimously in Committee II on Dec. 12 and in plenary on Dec. 14.

(c) ascertain the extent to which Governments would be willing to contribute to the Special Fund;

5. *Requests* the President of the General Assembly to appoint the members of the Preparatory Committee;^{*}

6. *Invites* the Secretary-General to provide the Preparatory Committee with all the necessary facilities, including the provision of such expert consultants as might be required;

7. *Requests* Governments to assist the Preparatory Committee in its work by forwarding their views and suggestions to the Preparatory Committee through the Secretary-General and, in particular, by indicating the extent to which they would be willing to contribute to the Special Fund;

8. *Invites* the Secretary-General, the executive heads of the specialized agencies and the Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board to forward their views and suggestions to the Preparatory Committee;

9. *Requests* the Preparatory Committee to submit the results of its work in the form of a report and recommendations to the twenty-sixth session of the Economic and Social Council;

10. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to transmit the Preparatory Committee's Report, together with its own comments, to the thirteenth session of the General Assembly for final action;

11. *Looks forward* to the establishment of the Special Fund as of 1 January 1959;

12. *Appeals* to all States Members of the United Nations, in a spirit of co-operation and solidarity, to give the greatest possible assistance to the Special Fund;

C.

Decides that as and when the resources prospectively available are considered by the General Assembly to be sufficient to enter into the field of capital development, principally the development of the economic and social infrastructure of the less developed countries, the General Assembly shall review the scope and future activities of the Fund and take such action as it may deem appropriate.

ANNEX

I. The Special Fund shall be a multilateral fund of the United Nations, with financial resources principally derived from voluntary annual contributions of Governments and others in (or transferable into) currency usable by it and as much as possible pledged or indicated for a number of years.

II. Assistance from the Special Fund shall be given only to projects which would make a contribution to the economic development of the requesting country or countries. The operations of the Special Fund shall be in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and shall not be influenced by political considerations.

^{*}The President appointed Canada, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, India, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia.

III. The Special Fund shall be administered by a chief executive officer under policies established by an executive body in accordance with such rules and principles as may be laid down by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. The membership of the executive body shall be equally distributed between two groups, one consisting mainly of major contributing countries and the other consisting mainly of less developed countries. Each member of the executive body shall have one vote. Decisions of the executive body on questions of policy, including the allocation of funds, shall require a qualified majority vote.

U.N. Calls for Further Study on Freedom of Information

Statement by Philip Klutznick

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

The debates on the subject of freedom of information held in the United Nations during the past 9 years indicate that there are in general three points of view on the subject of freedom of information.

One point of view is that information should be controlled by the state. Those who hold this view recognize, either through their words or through their actions, that information determines opinions, and opinions in turn are a vital element in state power, and, therefore, by controlling information, opinions of citizens can consciously be set to serve goals determined by those in power. Control of information is then in the hands of the same few who control other components of state power. From such a point of view, freedom of information as a practical proposal is dangerous and a threat to their continuance in authority.

The second point of view is that freedom of information is valuable and is important as a means by which individual citizens may seek the truth. At the same time those holding this second point of view are strongly impressed with what they consider to be the "abuses" of freedom of information. They are more concerned with such "abuses" than they are with the danger from barriers to the free flow of information. For those who hold this view the fundamental problem is where and how to strike the balance between freedom and control of information.

¹Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) on Dec. 6 (U.S. delegation press release 2835).

The third group holds that freedom of information is essential, admits that abuses can occur, but believes that the way to cure abuses is to increase the opportunities for men to seek more complete information. For this group the fundamental objective is to remove obstacles to the free flow of information.

With these three different points of view it is clear that the search for greater freedom of information takes us in many different directions, sometimes in opposite directions.

The United States takes, of course, this third view. The freest and fullest flow of information is basic to a democratic system of government.

This is true, first, because there has never been a way devised to control news and information without opening the way to abuse in the form of thought control. In time of peace it is never safe to trust any men or institution of men with the power to decide for others what is good and what is bad information. To do so leads inevitably to a form of totalitarianism.

There is a second way in which the United States believes that freedom of information is basic to a democratic government. Democracy is based on the capacity of individual citizens to make intelligent and rational judgments if given access to the facts. There may be times when the majority will be mistaken and when rational processes will break down. But these will be exceptional, and in a sound democracy based on a full, free flow of information the truth eventually becomes apparent and right judgments will be made.

Those who stress restrictions on freedom of information do not believe that their citizens can be trusted. It isn't wise, in such a view, to let individuals judge for themselves what they should believe and what they should discard as unsound. From such a point of view, if individual errors in information or individual cases of deliberate misrepresentation can be discovered, they are evidence of the need for restrictions in some form.

In the United States we have found that, while in a free society with unhampered flow of information there may be some distortion, errors, and misrepresentation, these are simply the chaff around the kernels of truth which are also present. The important thing is the total information available to the individual. We believe that

when information flows unhampered the total impact will be to create sound opinions. We believe individual citizens are able to decide what to keep and what to discard.

It is because freedom of information is so fundamental to our system of government and our society that we have incorporated freedom of the press as one of the basic and inviolate freedoms in our Constitution's Bill of Rights. It is for this reason that the U.S. is opposed to the so-called Convention on Freedom of Information.

The United States is opposed to the draft Convention on Freedom of Information. We oppose this convention because it has become in effect a proposal to limit and restrict the basic human rights of freedom of speech and of the press. As such, it is in direct contradiction to the principles and objectives of the U.N. and UNESCO and should be rejected by this body.

These views are not new. In commenting on this text in 1951, the United States Government pointed out that the proposed draft is not consistent with long-established and deeply cherished principles of freedom of speech and freedom of the press as understood in the United States and that, in fact, certain provisions expressly violate these principles. For example, article 2 would permit objectionable and unnecessary limitations on freedom of expression, together with other restrictions which, while perhaps not objectionable in principle, are so formulated as to lead to the probability of their abuse by governments so inclined. They provide not a curb on obstacles to freedom of information but an invitation to restrictions. Article 2, taken together with article 5, provides a full basis on which information can be controlled, and information control is the same as thought control.

Enumeration of such specific limitations on freedom of information is probably inevitable in a convention on freedom of information and likewise inevitably vitiates what should be our primary purpose of promoting greater freedom of information. The United States joined in early efforts to draft this convention. We have come to the conclusion, however, that it is impractical to attempt a convention on this subject and that further work along this line is a waste of United Nations time and resources. We should not recommend United Nations approval of an agreement embodying the lowest common denominator

of freedom of information; the potential of the United Nations should be devoted to safeguarding and promoting the maximum of freedom in this as in other human rights.

It is important that we keep our objective clearly in mind. Our aim is to promote freedom of information. We must be very careful that, in selecting the means by which we seek to achieve this objective, we do not create obstacles in the way of its realization. Freedom of information is in great danger these days. Freedom of speech and of the press is severely restricted in many parts of the world. Unless we keep our objective very clearly in mind, therefore, we may end by *imposing further restrictions* on that freedom. This is the real danger in the present convention.

There is one aspect of the position of my Government which I wish to state as clearly and as strongly as I can. When the press and the Government of the United States speak out against this convention, it is, of course, with the intent of protecting and safeguarding our own freedom, which we regard as priceless and indispensable. But in a sense we are speaking even more in behalf of freedom for all people. As a matter of fact, under our Constitution the Government of the United States could not impose the kind of restrictions we are now discussing even if it were to become a party to a convention which sets them forth as permissible. The prohibition against any law abridging the freedom of the press contained in the Bill of Rights, which is part of the Constitution of the United States, cannot be superseded by a treaty.

But my Government objects to this convention because we do not want to see *any* people subjected to such limitations. We have long since learned that our freedom is strengthened to the extent that the freedom of others is protected. The press and the people of the United States are convinced on this point.

Can it be that the free press in any free country feels differently from ours? We do not think so. On the contrary, we believe that the profession of journalism shares certain basic principles and ideals in common, irrespective of nationality. We believe that the great majority of editors and journalists, whether in France or the United States, in India or Egypt, would not approve of such restrictions. In short, we are convinced that these proposals do not have the backing of the free press in any free country.

Fortunately, during recent years we have found ways to promote freedom of information. I am thinking particularly of the United Nations advisory services and program of fellowships for news personnel organized in the summer of 1956 in Geneva; the UNESCO studies of mass communication, including transmission of news; and other studies and discussions in the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council. As we have heard, the Human Rights Commission has appointed a committee composed of representatives of France, India, Lebanon, Mexico, and Poland, for the purpose of examining and reviewing decisions on freedom of information made by the various organs of the United Nations and the work done in the field by the specialized agencies, and to make recommendations to the Human Rights Commission for further action.² Also, the Economic and Social Council in its 23d session invited the Secretary-General to analyze information received from governments and specialized agencies on media of information in underdeveloped countries,³ taking into account any recommendations the Human Rights Commission might make. The Council also urged governments to take advantage of the United Nations and the specialized agencies programs of technical assistance and advisory services for the promotion of freedom of information. These programs have the particular virtue of flexibility and can be adapted to the needs of any area for which a government requests assistance in improving freedom of information and therefore offer great possibilities for practical use.

For these reasons we need not regard the convention as our only avenue to promote freedom of information. On the contrary, since this draft was prepared in 1951 the United Nations program on freedom of information has come a long way into more dynamic and effective methods of work. This leads us to the challenge facing this committee. In our view the committee should seek forms of United Nations action which will leave behind the deadlock of the proposed convention and will enable us to move forward once again in the promotion of freedom of information.⁴

² U.N. doc. E/CN. 4/751 or E/2970, par. 205.

³ U.N. doc. E/Res/643 (XXIII).

⁴ The General Assembly on Dec. 13 adopted three resolutions calling for further study and consultation on freedom of information.

Problems of European Migration

NINTH SESSION OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SEVENTH SESSION OF COUNCIL OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION

by George L. Warren

The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, consisting of 27 member governments, was organized in 1951 on U.S. initiative to move out of Europe migrants and refugees who would not otherwise be moved. The Council of ICEM met at Geneva in its seventh session between October 7 and 12, 1957, with all 27 member governments represented.¹ Gust van Werveke (Luxembourg) presided as chairman.

The Executive Committee had met in its eighth (special) session August 12-14, 1957, to consider action necessitated by the untimely death in an automobile accident in July of ICEM's Deputy Director, Pierre Jacobsen, and his able staff assistant, Roberto Rossi-Longhi. The ninth session of the Executive Committee was held between September 26 and October 12 in meetings interspersed with those of the Council.

The important problems facing the Council were the continuing overseas movement of Hungarian refugees from Austria and Yugoslavia, the immediate need for additional funds to maintain the high rate of movement of European refugees from mainland China through Hong Kong, the onward movement from Europe of refugees arriving from Egypt, the substantial increase of refugees arriving in Austria and Italy from Yugoslavia, the election of a new Deputy Director, and

the still unresolved problem of securing sufficient annual income for operations to meet operational expenditures. During the course of the session Harold H. Tittmann, Director of ICEM since 1955, announced his intention to retire in 1958 at such time as the Council might be in a position to elect his successor.

Pattern of Movements in 1957

The revised budget and plan of expenditure for 1957 presented an estimate of 208,125 for total movements of persons for the year, broken down as follows: normal movements, 124,360; Hungarian movements overseas, 49,520; intra-European Hungarian movements, 8,370; movements of refugees from Egypt, 15,150; Hungarian refugees from Yugoslavia, 7,925; and refugees from Hong Kong and miscellaneous movements, 2,800. Financial income for 1957 was estimated at \$63,204,316—\$60,408,127 for operations and \$2,796,189 for administration. Of this total the program for movement of Hungarian refugees from all areas was expected to account for

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¹ For an announcement of the U.S. delegation, see BULLETIN of Oct. 21, 1957, p. 661. For an article by Mr. Warren on the sixth session of the Council and the seventh session of the Executive Committee, see *ibid.*, Aug. 19, 1957, p. 329.

\$13,652,736. Government contributions to the Special Fund were estimated at \$1,673,879, income from migrant reimbursements for movements in previous years at \$1,700,000, and miscellaneous income at \$701,111, bringing the total income of the Special Fund to \$4,074,990. On balance, the pattern of movements in 1957 appeared to be working out favorably in so far as the income of the Committee for the year was concerned. Substantial deficits, anticipated earlier in the year, had not developed. The only two programs requiring additional income before the end of the year were those for refugees from the Middle East and the Far East.

Although some government members challenged the estimates of certain movements in the general discussion on the revision of the budget for 1957, the overall total remained unchanged and the Council accepted the proposed revisions. The cumulative total of all Hungarian refugees moved out of Europe by ICEM from November 6, 1956, through September 30, 1957, was 88,452. The number remaining in Austria at the end of the year was estimated at 18,000.

Refugees From Far East

The Director's report on refugees from the Far East indicated that movements from Hong Kong had been higher than anticipated during 1957 and that a total movement of 2,700 for the year would be possible provided additional funds were forthcoming. The discussion during the Council session produced a total of pledges of \$207,800 in additional funds. Much larger sums would, however, be needed if some 1,000 European refugees already in Hong Kong and 800 additional in China, who were in possession of Hong Kong transit visas, were to be moved before the end of the year. There would still remain over 12,000 refugees on mainland China for whose movement between \$6 million and \$8 million would be required over the next 3 years.

On the advice of the Executive Committee, the Council decided that the administration should continue to move European refugees from Hong Kong to the extent that contributions especially earmarked for this purpose were received but that, in the light of the exhaustion of funds available to ICEM for this purpose and the current inadequate response of governments to ICEM's appeals for the Far Eastern movement, no special appeals

for funds in the magnitude required would be made in 1958. The Council recognized that ICEM's regular funds could not be allocated for this purpose and that ICEM's contribution to the further movement of European refugees from Hong Kong would depend solely upon the funds made available to it for such movements in the future on the initiative of interested governments. ICEM's organization and facilities in transportation would remain available for such services as might be required.

In the discussion on the Director's progress report, the Italian representative reminded the Council of the need for concentrating attention on ways and means of developing increased movements of normal migrants from Southern Europe to Latin America. The representative of Greece deplored the fact that current emigration from Greece was proving disappointing to his Government. Other comments of a general nature were to the effect that ICEM had more than justified its existence in organizing and achieving the movement of over 150,000 Hungarian refugees in the short period since the revolution and that ICEM's organization and machinery should therefore be maintained as an assurance of similar effective action in emergencies that might arise in the future.

During the year ICEM had maintained experimental efforts in the application of technical services to the selection, processing, reception, and placement of migrants and refugees. Two model processing centers, one in Austria and one in Italy, were now in operation, and certain trust funds contributed by specially interested governments, Chile and Italy, were being devoted to the placement of worker immigrants in Latin American countries.

Budget for 1958

After revising the Director's original estimates as overoptimistic, the Executive Committee recommended and the Council finally adopted a budget and plan of operations for 1958 based on a total estimated movement of 157,270 and income of \$40,632,482—\$37,390,070 for operations and \$3,242,412 for administration. The movement estimate was lower by 50,000 than the previously adopted figure for 1957, and the estimate of total income was reduced still further by the elimination from the 1958 budget of book credits and

debts of some \$10 million in recognition of government services performed directly in the migration process which, on experience, had proved of no practical value in previous budget presentations. This latter action had no effect on the continuing requirements of government contributions.

The breakdown of the movement estimate is as follows: normal migrants and refugees, 135,530; Hungarian refugees overseas from all areas in Europe, 11,550; refugees arriving in Europe from Egypt, 10,120; miscellaneous movements, 70; total, 157,270. It appeared to be the general sense of the Council, in accepting the foregoing estimates, that, apart from the lower movement of Hungarian refugees overseas in 1958, the general trend of movements of normal migrants out of Europe would be downward. Movements of all categories of migrants and refugees under the Committee's auspices had been unusually high in 1957; barring unusual developments, it was not expected that this experience would be repeated in 1958. However, the continuing necessity of maintaining the flow of refugees overseas and of stimulating further movement from the southern European countries was recognized. The suggestion developed in the discussion that one of the most important factors affecting the volume of movement out of Europe in 1958 would be the reports in letters received in Europe from migrants and refugees who had moved in immediately preceding years on their experiences in securing immediate employment, housing, and acceptable wages after arrival in the countries of immigration.

On the recommendations of the Director and the Executive Committee, the Council adopted a series of amendments affecting staff benefits and emoluments which brought ICEM's salary scales and staff provisions approximately into line with those provided by the United Nations and its related international agencies.

Working Group Suggestions

The Working Group of five governments—Australia, Brazil, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States—which was set up at the fifth session of the Council in October 1956, had held two meetings in January and August 1957, and they reported to the Council.

The suggestions of the Working Group that the governments cooperate more closely with the ad-

ministration in constructing better estimates of movements and that the administration improve the presentation of requirements to the Council by achieving brevity and conciseness in the texts and a progressive reduction in the number and volume of the documents issued were accepted readily by the Executive Committee and the Council.

A more specific suggestion of the Working Group was that the Council establish a new section in the budget for 1959 to include expenditures for international activities performed by ICEM which are necessary to, and in fact do, increase the volume of migration, are apart from actual transport services, and are not normally performed either by the emigration or the immigration country. The Working Group identified and listed such services presently being performed and determined that their total cost was approximately \$1,500,000 annually. The Working Group assumed that these services should be of common interest to all governments, as they serve the main purpose of the organization, and that they should be supported by voluntary contributions from all members based on an agreed-upon percentage scale, in a manner similar to that in which the budget for the administrative expenditures is presently met. Experience has shown that in varying degrees all the member governments have required and benefited directly from these activities in the carrying out of their own emigration or immigration programs.

A fourth suggestion of the Working Group was that the Council progressively adopt a series of policy statements or directives to the administration as a guide in its negotiations with governments with respect to the particular movements which ICEM might undertake and the amounts of ICEM's free funds which might be applied to such movements. The Working Group pointed out that the only present statement of policies or directives supplied by the Council was the constitution adopted in 1953. The constitution, which is drawn in very general terms, is an inadequate guide to the administration in the constantly changing political and economic situation in Europe in which ICEM conducts its operations. The adoption of specific policies, as soon as they have crystallized from experience or general agreement by member governments, would give more positive direction to ICEM's operations in the future and would serve as a public statement of ICEM's functions and objectives.

Although some member governments expressed preliminary reservations with respect to future contributions to the operational part of the budget, the report of the Working Group was generally well received by the Council. The Council then directed that copies of the report and the record of the discussion thereon be transmitted to the governments immediately for consideration and comment in anticipation that the Working Group would meet again in February 1958 to formulate proposals based on the comments received for presentation to the Council at the April session in 1958. Should the governments finally adopt the budget proposal of the Working Group, a substantial part of the problem of the annual shortfall in operational income, now met by the device of the Special Fund, would be resolved.

Election of Deputy Director

The election of a Deputy Director to succeed Pierre Jacobsen (France) raised questions of procedure for the Council. While a majority of governments desired to proceed to an election immediately, others urged delay in order that a Deputy Director might be finally chosen whose qualifications and experience would complement those of the Director to be elected to succeed Mr. Tittmann, who had announced his intention to retire. The view of the majority finally prevailed, and Barthelmy Georges Epinat (France) was unanimously elected to the post of Deputy Director.

Representatives Frank Chelf and Patrick J. Hillings, congressional advisers to the U.S. representative to the Council, and Roderic L. O'Connor, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, and head of the U.S. delegation, addressed the Council during the course of the session. Representative Chelf outlined the provisions of legislation recently adopted by the last Congress providing for the reunion of families in the United States and the admission of parents of U.S. citizens and of certain categories of refugees on a nonquota basis.

Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United States, and Venezuela were elected by the Council to constitute the Executive Committee to serve during 1958. Baron van Boetzelaer (Netherlands) was elected chairman.

Since it began operations in February 1952, ICEM had moved a total of 729,218 migrants and refugees to countries of permanent resettlement. Based on this record of past performance, a general spirit of optimism prevailed with respect to ICEM's future operations.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Accession deposited (with reservations): Israel, August 1, 1957.

Cultural Property

Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.¹
Ratification deposited: Libya, November 19, 1957.
Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.¹
Ratification deposited: Libya, November 19, 1957.

Whaling

Protocol amending the international whaling convention of 1946 (TIAS 1849). Done at Washington November 19, 1956.²
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, December 23, 1957.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement providing for a cooperative program for reconnaissance and investigation of the uranium resources of Brazil. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 26, 1957. Entered into force December 26, 1957.

Agreement providing for a cooperative program for reconnaissance of the uranium resources of Brazil, as extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro August 3, 1955. Entered into force August 3, 1955. TIAS 3385.

Terminated: December 26, 1957 (replaced by agreement of December 26, 1957, *supra*).

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 23-29

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press release issued prior to December 23 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 674 of December 20.

No.	Date	Subject
675	12/23	Dulles: return from NATO meeting (printed in BULLETIN of Jan. 6).
676	12/23	Visit of Prime Minister of Laos.
*677	12/23	Herter: Christmas message.
*678	12/23	McClintock appointed Ambassador to Lebanon (biographic details).
*679	12/26	Yost appointed Ambassador to Syria (biographic details).
680	12/26	Uranium prospecting in Brazil.
*681	12/27	William J. Kelly retirement.
682	12/28	Dulles: year-end statement.
683	12/28	Secretary Dulles to attend Baghdad Pact session.

*Not printed.

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